REVIEW: ‘IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE?’
March 15th, 2008Review - overview, critique and response - of:
‘Is Democracy Possible?’ (John Burnheim, 1989, U. California Press)
SUMMARY
As a practical basis for their persistent rational advocacy of change, political reformers require a set of sufficiently complete and consistent quantifiable goals for performance of public decision-making bodies. This landmark book largely fails to articulate such goals, but it does recognize the need for them, and it moreover gives an inspiring account, at once visionary and practical, of major democratic features of the political system that cogent reform goals will likely require. In a forthcoming essay this reviewer will not only propose an initial set of quantifiable performance goals but also will illustrate how such goals may be used in the rational selection of reform aims, and in other reform decisions.
OVERVIEW
In its introduction this book acknowledges that pure democracy - all the people making all the public decisions - is impossible or ineffectual, at least given today’s large populations. However, the practical question is whether a version of democratic governance, notably better than today’s regimes, is possible; and if so then what might be its essential features. The book well answers this question in the affirmative. Its proposed solution for political structure, termed demarchy, is defined by two readily understood and envisioned, though as yet untypical, features (pp. 7 and 9), namely ‘functional autonomy and ’statistical representation.’
FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY replaces today’s monolithic ’state’ - i.e. sovereign multi-purpose regimes, such as nation-states or all-services cities - by autonomous special-purpose agencies.
The jurisdictions - i.e. regions and groups - served by agencies for a given purpose are functional for that purpose. They need not coincide with another purpose’ jurisdictions.
Responsibilities assigned now to large hierarchic state-run or corporate ‘vertical’ bureaucracies are filled, arguably far better, by the agencies’ executive teams in ‘horizontal’ relationships. Coordination among various agencies occurs not by central or hierarchic control but by negotiations and - if need be - arbitration. Findings of arbitration are backed not by centralized force but by public opinion, reinforced by other agencies’ sanctions.
STATISTICAL REPRESENTATION is used to choose decision-makers for any given agency.
Namely, good deliberative decision-making cannot be expected from a merely formal ‘democratic’ setup wherein everyone votes on every question, regardless of their interest or degree of involvement. Effective decision-making requires limiting the decision-makers on a given matter to a manageable number of persons who moreover each have a legitimate material interest in the matter to be decided. Hence (p. 9) ‘decision-making bodies should be statistically representative of those affected by their decisions. Democracy is possible only if the decision-makers are a representative sample of the people concerned.’
Such representation is to be achieved (p. 9) by ‘the ancient principle of choosing by lot those who are to hold various public offices … The illusory control exercised by voting for representatives has to be replaced by the chance of being selected [by lot] as an active participant in the formulation of decisions. Elections … inherently breed oligarchies.’ So representatives are to be chosen by lot from among those affected people who moreover are willing voluntarily to spend some time in deliberating on the matter with their peers.
PRACTICALITY. The book argues persuasively that demarchy could be introduced gradually and in practical stages.
POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES. The book also argues persuasively that demarchy - or anyhow its functional autonomy feature - could be expected to improve the quality and desirable scope of public decision-making in matters of major importance, including matters of peace and security, resources management and economic policy. The largely horizontal inter-agency relationships would obstruct creation and abuses of totalitarian power, including aggressive wars.
Functional autonomy could also permit a well-balanced ‘mixed economy’ whose operation could realize constructive goals traditionally sought by activists of every kind (from philosophers to revolutionaries) and stripe - including those of communalism, socialism, welfareism and capitalism.
Namely, control of various resources and financial institutions could be assigned to a variety of autonomous public trust agencies, whose decision-makers would represent a variety of interests including arguably those of future generations. These agencies would interact to constrain resource prices and money availability, but these prices and availability would operate within an open market system of production and consumption, so as to enable market-driven efficiencies and promotion of enterprise. Income to the public trusts from land and other resources could replace taxation and moreover allow a comprehensive system of basic welfare, including a guaranteed minimum income.
CRITIQUE
As detailed in the following paragraphs, the book is at once inspiring and quite flawed and incomplete. The book does well to seek, above all, ‘reappraisal of the whole problem of public decision-making’ - but it takes only first steps to address this aim. A rational reappraisal must at least suggest a set (perhaps incomplete) of cogent quantifiable performance goals and resulting procedures for public decision-making: but the book scarcely does this. As presented in the book, the demarchy concept is logically muddled: its first key feature (functional autonomy) is at times - but wrongly - treated as though logically implied and necessitated by the second (statistical representation). The book calls for public decision-making by various ’statistically representative’ groups, but this overall method in fact includes, as extremes, both impractical direct democracy and intolerable oligarchy. The book scarcely discusses what criteria to use for making the needed choices of parameters which specify the preferred number and size of groups and length of members’ service.
ON TARGET! According to the introduction’s last paragraph, the author has ‘many ideas about the practical details of implementing demarchic principles that are not mentioned in this book. To do so would have been misleading. What I am anxious to produce is a radical reappraisal of the whole problem of public decision-making.’
The author’s aim is on target: precisely such reappraisal is what reformers need!
So far as this reviewer can see, explicit rational appraisal - radical or otherwise - of ‘the whole problem of public decision-making’ has been lacking during the entire history, spanning over two millennia, of political philosophy and so-called political science. Instead both these disciplines both have presumed that decisions must be made by a centralized state, and both have been content to either describe and analyze actual state decision-making or else to speculate on would be an ideal (or better-run) state.
MISSING FIRST STEP. The needed ‘rational appraisal’ must start with the fact that, above all, public decision-making is group decision-making. Its design or reform must hinge above all on goals - and their implied procedural directives and constraints - posited for decision-making in general and in particular for group decision-making.
The book’s big deficiency is that it scarcely takes this first step, to explicitly posit such goals. Of course, some clearly cogent goals for group decision-making do imply an important role for democratic practices, and in turn those arguably will call for both key features of demarchy. However, other evident goals for rational group decision are disregarded or are even treated inconsistently.
A notable example is the overall goal of precaution and in particular the prevention of undue concentration or monopoly of powers of decision and enforcement. This very goal seems to be the major rationale for the book’s call to abolish ‘the state’ as a monolithic all-powerful entity. However, although even the antiquated USA federal constitution explicitly addresses this need, in its provisions for ’separation of powers’, the book’s version of demarchy fails to incorporate precaution or to forbid monopoly. On the contrary, within its jurisdiction each ‘functionally autonomous’ agency is allowed and indeed assumed to be an unchallenged monopoly: with no requirement that even internally the decisions of that agency require concurrence of one or more separated power centers, e.g. a primary decision committee and then a review committee.
DEMARCHY A MUDDLE. Demarchy is first presented as combining two major features - functional autonomy of agencies, and statistical representation of decision-makers. However, demarchy is then formally equated (p. 9) just to the second feature. This muddling of two different concepts is logically insupportable. Neither of the two features implies the other and in particular the second does not imply the first. Statistical representation could be used to run a monolithic state. Conversely, functionally autonomous units could each be run by an appointed or elected oligarchy.
The book moreover fails to recognize and respond to the fact that, no matter how narrowly one defines the scope of a given ‘functionally autonomous’ agency, distinct decisions by that agency may well affect distinct (if likely overlapping) populations, and hence true ’statistical representativeness’ will in general require use of different decision-makers for different decisions by that agency, not just the agency’s single controlling ‘representative’ body.
UNADDRESSED CHOICES FOR DEMOCRACY. The book presumes correctly that rational decision-making requires deliberation that normally can be done only by a small-enough group working over a long-enough time. Hence, in a large society or other group, acceptable decision-making on each issue directly by ‘all the people’ is impossible. As the book also argues implicitly, we can still have a democracy more direct than today’s de facto oligarchy, wherein all decisions are made by an elite of long-term-serving officers, appointed or elected.
The book in effect argues for practicality of a middle way: assignment of decisions to a larger number of small shorter-term groups. Such a middle way is not a single option, but rather is subject to various parametric choices as to number and size of groups and length of their members’ terms of service. The choices range from impossible direct democracy at one extreme to intolerable total oligarchy, even autarchy, at another. The book leaves open the criteria for arriving at preferred middle-way parametric choices.
RESPONSE
This reviewer is currently preparing and will post an essay, ‘How Many Should Decide?’, which formulates democratic and other relevant goals for group decision-making and which goes on to illustrate how, using basic decision-analytic methods, these and like goals may be used to select political reform aims and target reform efforts.
In particular, the essay explores criteria for preferred parametric choices for implementing the book’s demarchic concept of decision-making by a number of small limited-term groups.
The essay also explores and quantifies measures of quantity and distributional equality of decision power, as objective and replicable indicators of ‘democracy’.
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